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I. Introduction 
Austrian economics is said to lack a distinct theory of the firm (Loasby 1991; Foss 
1994; Witt 1999).  Several recent writers have sensed an intellectual kinship between 
Austrian economics and the “capabilities” theory of the firm, an approach to 
economic organization that takes seriously the Hayekian notions of tacit, dispersed 
knowledge and rule-following behavior (Malmgren 1961; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985; 
Loasby 1991; Langlois 1992, 1995, 1998; Foss 1997, Foss and Christensen 2001; 
Dulbecco and Garrouste 1999).  Exploring this theme has become a virtual cottage 
industry in recent years. However, the literature has produced few distinctive 
insights and refutable implications, and is instead largely limited to exploring 
similarities that exist between the two bodies of thought.   We are concerned by what 
we see as a neglect of other important Austrian themes  particularly 
entrepreneurship and capital theory  in the recent literature on Austrian economics 
and the firm.1        
  Here we outline an Austrian approach to economic organization based on the 
entrepreneur and the Austrian idea of capital as heterogeneous and time-
dimensioned, two themes associated closely with Kirzner’s (1966, 1973, 1997) 
contributions.  Our unit of analysis is the capital asset. We start with the Austrian 
concept of heterogeneous capital and provide an economic interpretation of such 
heterogeneity.  In our view, capital assets are heterogeneous to the extent that they 
possess various attributes, many of which may be unknown to the owners of these 
assets.  Moreover, many attributes are costly to measure.  These facts help explain a 
host of traditional and neglected issues in the theory of economic organization.   In 
other words, the theory of the firm has much to gain from embracing Kirznerian 
ideas on entrepreneurship and capital heterogeneity. 
  Because entrepreneurs typically lack perfect knowledge of an asset’s relevant 
attributes, it is usually the assets themselves, and not particular attributes, which are 
traded in capital markets.  Ownership of an asset confers the (residual) right to 
exploit future, as yet undiscovered, attributes of that asset, and entrepreneurs may 
acquire assets precisely to be in a position to exploit these future attributes.  This 
reason for acquiring ownership rights helps explain changes in firm boundaries 
through mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures: Entrepreneurs often must “try out” 
various capital assets, and combinations of assets, to gauge the value of these assets 
when used in production.  We further argue that aspects of internal organization, 
such as the authority relation, can be understood as attempts to economize on the 
costs of experimenting with heterogeneous capital assets.  In this sense, our approach 
also holds the key to a theory of the existence of the firm.  
                                                 
1  Exceptions are Dulbecco and Garrouste (1999) and Lewin (1998), who discuss capabilities ideas in 
the context of Austrian capital theory, and Witt (1999), who tries to integrate the entrepreneur and 
the theory of the firm.  Klein (1999) emphasizes the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
firm boundaries. 
 1
II. Capital Heterogeneity 
Austrian Capital Theory 
The concept of heterogeneous capital has a long and distinguished place in 
Austrian economics.2  The development of Austrian capital theory has been marked 
by the struggle to develop consistent analytical categories and aggregate measures 
for a class of goods that are fundamentally heterogeneous.  In general, Austrian 
writers have moved away from relatively aggregate concepts emphasized by Böhm-
Bawerk (1959) towards increasingly disaggregated ones that are more consistent with 
Austrian methodological individualism and subjectivism (Lewin 2000). A high point 
of this evolution is Kirzner’s 1966 book, An Essay on Capital, which Garrison (1997: 
511) calls “possibly the most underrated of all [Kirzner’s] contributions.” 
Early Austrian writers recognized that capital has a time dimension as well as 
a value dimension.  Menger (1871) characterized goods in terms of “orders”: Goods 
of lowest order are those consumed directly; tools and machines used to produce 
those consumption goods are of a higher order; and those capital goods used to 
produce the tools and machines are of an even higher order.3 Building on his theory 
that the value of all goods is determined by their ability to satisfy consumer wants, 
Menger showed that the value of the higher-order goods is given (“imputed”) by the 
value of the lower-order goods they produce.  Moreover, because certain capital 
goods are themselves produced by other, higher-order capital goods, it follows that 
capital goods are not identical, at least by the time they are employed in the 
production process.  This is not to say that there is no substitution among capital 
goods, but that the degree of substitution is limited; as Lachmann (1956) put it, 
capital goods are characterized by “multiple specificity.” Some substitution is 
possible, but only at a cost.  
Hayek’s Prices and Production (1931) introduced the famous “Hayekian 
triangles” to illustrate the relationship between the value of capital goods and their 
place in the temporal sequence of production. Because production takes time, factors 
of production must be committed in the present for making final goods that will 
have value only in the future after they are sold. However, capital is heterogeneous. 
As capital goods are used in production, they are transformed from general-purpose 
materials and components to intermediate products specific to particular final goods. 
Consequently, these assets cannot be easily redeployed to alternative uses if 
demands for final goods change. The central macroeconomic problem in a modern 
capital-using economy is thus one of intertemporal coordination: how can the allocation 
of resources between capital and consumer goods be aligned with consumers’ 
preferences between present and future consumption? In The Pure Theory of Capital 
(1941) Hayek describes how the economy’s structure of production depends on the 
characteristics of capital goods—durability, complementarity, substitutability, 
specificity, and so on. This structure can be described by the various “investment 
                                                 
2  See Lewin (2000) for an overview. 
3  Böhm-Bawerk (1959) used the term “maturity classes” for the same concept. 
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periods” of inputs, an extension of Böhm-Bawerk’s notion of “roundaboutness,” the 
degree to which production uses resources over time.4 
This understanding of capital as a complex structure formed the basis of the 
Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle. Monetary injections, by lowering the rate 
of interest below its “natural rate,” distort the economy’s intertemporal structure of 
production. The reduction in interest rates caused by credit expansion directs 
resources toward capital-intensive processes and early stages of production (whose 
investment demands are more interest-rate elastic), thus “lengthening” the period of 
production. Investments in some stages of production are “malinvestments” if they 
do not help to align the structure of production to consumers’ intertemporal 
preferences. The boom generated by the increase in investment is artificial; 
eventually, market participants come to realize that there are not enough savings to 
complete all the new projects, and the boom becomes a bust as these malinvestments 
are discovered and liquidated.  
The concept of “malinvestment” is foreign to neoclassical production theory 
(as well as mainstream macroeconomics), which usually considers only the level of 
investment. Modern production theory focuses on a single stage of production in 
which “capital,” along with other inputs, is transformed into final goods. In 
economics textbooks, the “firm” is a production function or production possibilities 
set, a “black box” that transforms inputs into outputs. Given the existing state of 
technology, the prices of inputs, and a demand schedule, the firm maximizes money 
profits subject to the constraint that its production plans must be technologically 
feasible. The legal boundary of the firm – defined in terms of the ownership of assets 
– is indeterminate in these models. 
Kirzner’s Essay on Capital (1966) provided an important refinement to the 
Austrian theory of capital by emphasizing the role of the entrepreneur (the theme 
that dominates Kirzner’s later work).5 Earlier Austrian writers, particularly Böhm-
Bawerk, tried to characterize the economy’s capital structure in terms of its physical 
attributes. Böhm-Bawerk attempted to describe the temporal “length” of the 
structure of production by a single number, the “average period of production.” This 
attempt Böhm-Bawerk was sharply criticized by John Bates Clark (1893) and by 
Menger himself (who called Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory “one of the greatest errors 
ever committed” (Schumpeter 1954: 847n8)). Kirzner’s approach avoids these 
difficulties by defining capital assets in terms of subjective, individual production 
plans, plans that are formulated and continually revised by profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs. Capital goods should thus be characterized, not by their physical 
properties, but by their place in the structure of production as conceived by 
entrepreneurs. The actual place of any capital good in the time sequence of production 
is given by the market for capital goods, in which entrepreneurs bid for factors of 
production in anticipation of future consumer demands. This subjectivist, 
                                                 
4  Hayek ultimately rejected Böhm-Bawerk’s “average period of production” as a useful concept, 
though he had used it earlier in Prices and Production (1931) (see Hayek 1941).  
5  See also the essays collected in Kirzner 1996. 
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entrepreneurial approach to capital assets is particularly congenial to theories of the 
firm that focus on entrepreneurship and the ownership of assets.  
An “Attributes Approach” to Capital Heterogeneity 
Given the lengthy debates between the Austrian school (and within the 
Austrian school itself) on the problems of measuring a heterogeneous capital stock, it 
is surprising that relatively little analytical effort has been devoted to the concept of 
heterogeneity itself.  The notion of heterogeneous capital is crucial not just for 
Austrian capital theory, but for (Austrian) economics in general.  For example, 
economic calculation – the tool entrepreneurs use to align the economy’s structure of 
production with consumer wants – would be severely limited in a world of 
homogenous capital.  The entrepreneur’s primary function is to choose among the 
various combinations of factors suitable for producing particular goods (and to 
decide whether these goods should be produced at all), based on current prices for 
the factors and expected future prices of the final goods.  If capital is a single “good,” 
with one price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing between capital-
intensive and labor-intensive production methods (or among types of labor). 
Lachmann (1956: 13, 16), by contrast, stressed that real-world entrepreneurship 
consists primarily of choosing among combinations of capital assets:  
We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations 
… will be ever changing, will be dis-solved and re-formed.  In this activity, 
we find the real function of the entrepreneur. 
[T]he entrepreneur’s function … is to specify and make decisions on the 
concrete form the capital resources shall have.  He specifies and modifies 
the layout of his plant ... As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of 
capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also remain hidden.   
Unfortunately, the implications of capital heterogeneity for entrepreneurship 
have received relatively little attention in the Austrian literature. Böhm-Bawerk’s 
approach to capital theory, which tends to obscure heterogeneity among capital 
goods within given levels of the overall structure of production, focused attention on 
the characteristics of the aggregate capital stock.  Hayek’s (1941) more complex (and 
microeconomic) treatment has remained relatively obscure.  Kirzner’s subjectivist, 
entrepreneurial approach provides a convenient way to approach the problem of 
heterogeneity.  Capital goods are not heterogeneous because of their objective 
characteristics, but because they play particular roles within the entrepreneur’s 
overall production plan.  In our interpretation, capital goods are distinguished by 
their attributes, in the terminology of Barzel (1997).6    
 Attributes are characteristics and possible uses of assets, as perceived by an 
entrepreneur.7 For example, a copying machine has multiple attributes in the sense 
                                                 
6  Foss and Foss (2000, 2002a&b) explore the links between Austrian economics and Barzel’s 
approach to the economics of property rights.  See also Moss (1991) for thoughts on the 
complementarity between notions of property rights and Austrian economics.  
7  In other words, they go beyond Lancasterian characteristics that are of a more objective character.  
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that it can be used at different time, by different people, for different types of copying 
work, that it can be purchased in different colors, sizes, and so on. Clearly, virtually 
all assets have multiple attributes. Specificity and complementarity  key notions in 
both Austrian capital theory and modern theories of economic organization 
(Williamson 1985, 1996; Hart 1995)  are more abstract examples of attributes. In our 
terminology, capital assets are heterogeneous to the extent that they have different, 
and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may also vary over time, even for 
a particular asset.  In a world of “true” uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to 
know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are made.  Nor 
can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with 
certainty.8  Future attributes must be discovered over time, as assets are used in 
production. Or, to formulate the problem slightly differently, future attributes are 
created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce consumer 
goods. 
Heterogeneous Assets, Property Rights, and Ownership 
Focusing on attributes not only helps illustrate the concept heterogeneous 
capital, but also illuminates the vast literature on property rights and ownership.  
Barzel (1997) stresses that property rights are held over attributes,9 and property 
rights to known attributes of assets are the relevant units of analysis in his work.  In 
contrast, he dismisses the notion of asset ownership as essentially legal and extra-
economic.  Similarly, Demsetz argues that the notion of “full private ownership” 
over assets is “vague,” and “must always remain so,” because “there is an infinity of 
potential rights of actions that can be owned … It is impossible to describe the 
complete set of rights that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz 1988: 19).   
 However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, not-yet-discovered 
attributes, and an important function of entrepreneurship is to create or discover 
these attributes.  Contrary to Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a distinct 
role for asset ownership -- i.e., for acquiring legal title to a bundle of existing 
attributes as well as to future attributes.  Specifically, ownership is a low-cost means 
of allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by the 
entrepreneur-owner.  For instance, those who create or discover new knowledge have 
an incentive to use it directly because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others.   In a 
well-functioning legal system, ownership of an asset normally implies that the courts 
will not interfere when an entrepreneur-owner captures the value of newly created 
or discovered attributes of an asset he owns.  Consequently, the entrepreneur-owner 
can usually avoid costly negotiation with those who are affected his creation or 
                                                 
8   This sense of uncertainty links naturally with the notion of contractual incompleteness.  We 
explore the implications of this idea below.  
9  Barzel (1994: 394; emphasis in original) defines a property right as “an individual’s net valuation, 
in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of the asset, or to consume it 
indirectly through exchange. A key word is ability: The definition is concerned not with what 
people are legally entitled to do but with what they believe they can do.”  Thus, property rights 
are essentially defined in a subjectivist manner, in terms of expectations.  
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discovery.  This keeps the dissipation of value at bay.  Of course, asset ownership 
itself provides a powerful incentive to create or discover new attributes, as 
ownership conveys the legally recognized (and at least partly enforced) right to the 
income of an asset, including the right to income from new attributes.10 
The idea of heterogeneous capital is thus a natural complement to the Austrian 
theory of entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new 
attributes of capital assets will want ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for 
speculative reasons and for reasons of economizing on transaction costs.  These 
arguments provide room for entrepreneurship that goes beyond deploying a 
superior combination of capital assets with “given” attributes, acquiring the relevant 
assets, and deploying these to producing for a market:  Entrepreneurship may also 
be a matter of experimenting with capital assets in an attempt to discover new valued 
attributed.   Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out 
new combinations through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the 
form of trying out new combinations of assets already under the control of the 
entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur’s success in experimenting with assets in this 
manner may depends on what Kirzner (1973) terms his “alertness,” along with 
secondary factors such as transaction costs in the market for corporate control, 
internal transaction costs, the entrepreneur’s control over the relevant assets, how 
much of the expected return from experimental activity that he can hope to 
appropriate, and so on.  These latter factors are key determinants of economic 
organization in modern theories of the firm.  This suggests that there may be fruitful 
complementarities between the theory of economic organization, which is essentially 
a theory about the arrangements of property titles that create an efficient 
employment of capital assets, and Austrian theories of capital heterogeneity and 
entrepreneurship.  These themes are developed in the following section.  
III. Economic Organization and Capital Heterogeneity 
In this section we argue that the Kirznerian subjectivist view of capital and 
entrepreneurship is a natural and valuable complement to modern theories of 
economic organization.  These theories focus on the efficient organization of 
heterogeneous assets, but do so in lieu of an explicit theory of (heterogeneous) capital 
and of the entrepreneur.  The treatment of capital outlined in this paper can improve 
our understanding of the dynamics of economic organization, such as changes in the 
boundaries of firms.  These dynamics are at least partly driven by entrepreneurial 
activity that aims at creating or discovering hitherto unknown attributes, and also by 
specific allocations of property rights and ownership that respond to this kind of 
entrepreneurial activity, leading to changes in the boundaries and internal 
                                                 
10  Moreover, ownership simplifies the process of entrepreneurial arbitrage (Kirzner 1973, 1997)—
and hence helps to close pockets of ignorance in the market—by allowing entrepreneurs to 
acquire, in one transaction, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a distinct asset). This means that 
the parties need not engage in costly bargaining over many rights to single attributes. The 
dissipation of value is thus minimized. 
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organization of firms.  We begin by outlining some links between modern theories of 
economic organization and Austrian ideas on capital and entrepreneurship. We then 
show how these ideas lead to distinct and novel insights about business 
combinations and aspects of internal organization. The discussion in the next draws 
largely on the authors’ previous work (Foss and Foss 2000a&b, 2001, 2002a&b; Klein 
1999, 2000; Klein and Klein 2001a&b).  
Austrian Capital Theory and the Theory of the Firm: The Role of Specific 
Investments   
In a world of homogenous capital  the “shmoo” of Solow-style growth 
models  economic organization would be relatively unimportant.  All capital assets 
possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, measuring, and 
monitoring the attributes of productive assets is trivial.  Exchange markets for assets 
would be virtually devoid of transaction costs.  A few basic contractual problems  
in particular, principal-agent conflicts over the supply of labor services  would 
remain, though workers would all use identical capital assets.  However, it is hard to 
see what role ownership of capital assets would play in this world.  If the costs of 
measuring and specifying attributes are low, entrepreneurs and factor owners could 
contract over attributes, and there would be little incentive to acquire ownership of 
assets themselves. Transactions involving such assets would be governed by 
complete, contingent contracts.11  Because contracts would substitute for ownership 
in a shmoo world, the boundaries of firms would be indeterminate (Hart 1995).  
By contrast, all modern theories of the firm assume (often implicitly) that  
capital assets possess varying attributes, so that all assets are not equally valuable in 
all uses.  Some theories also assume that it is impossible to write complete, 
contingent contracts specifying the most valuable uses of such assets in all possible 
states of the world (Williamson 1996; Hart 1995).  Contractual incompleteness 
exposes owners of productive assets to certain risks. Primarily, if circumstances 
change unexpectedly, the original contracts governing the use of these assets may no 
longer be effective. The need to adapt to unforeseen contingencies constitutes an 
important cost of contracting; failure to adapt imposes what Williamson (1991a) calls 
“maladaptation costs.”  
The most-often-discussed example of maladaptation is the “holdup” problem 
associated with relationship-specific investments.12 Investment in such assets exposes 
                                                 
11  Admittedly, the costs of drafting contracts could still leave many contracts incomplete, but this 
would not provide room for ownership either, as possessing completely homogenous capital 
would not confer any bargaining power in a trading relationship.  
12  The holdup problem is the best-known example of a contractual hazard. More generally, 
contractual difficulties can arise from several sources: (1) bilateral dependence; (2) weak property 
rights; (3) measurement difficulties; (4) intertemporal issues such as “disequilibrium contracting, 
real-time responsiveness, long latency, and strategic abuse”; and (5) weaknesses in the 
institutional environment (Williamson 1996: 14).  Each can impose maladaptation costs. 
Foreseeing this possibility, agents seek to reduce the potential costs of maladaptation by matching 
the appropriate governance structure with the particular characteristics of the transaction. 
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agents to a potential hazard: If circumstances change, their trading partners may try 
to expropriate the rents accruing to the specific assets. Suppose an upstream supplier 
tailors its equipment for a particular customer. After the equipment is in place, the 
customer may demand a lower price, knowing that the salvage value of the 
specialized equipment is lower than the net payment it offers.  In turn, this creates an 
under investment problem: Anticipating the customer’s behavior, the supplier will 
be unwilling to install the custom machinery without protection for such a 
contingency, even if the specialized technology would make the relationship more 
profitable for both sides.  
One way to safeguard rents accruing to specific assets is vertical (or lateral) 
integration, where a merger eliminates any adversarial interests. Less extreme 
options include long-term contracts, partial ownership, or agreements for both 
parties to invest in offsetting relationship-specific investments. Overall, several 
governance structures may be employed.  According to transaction cost theory 
(Williamson 1996; Hart 1995), parties tend to choose the governance structure that 
best controls the underinvestment problem, given the particulars of the relationship.
 In this way, the theory of the firm may be considered the study of alternative 
institutions of governance. Its working hypothesis, as expressed by Williamson 
(1991b: 79), is that economic organization is mainly an effort to “align transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs 
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way.”  
 It is obvious that maladaptation costs largely disappear if all assets are equally 
valuable in all uses.  Potential hold-up problems would still be a concern for owners 
of relationship-specific human capital and raw materials, but disagreements over the 
efficient use of capital goods would become irrelevant.  The scope of entrepreneurial 
activity would also be severely reduced, since entrepreneurs would have no need to 
try out (or “discover,” in Kirzner’s parlance) the relevant attributes of capital assets.  
 Capital heterogeneity thus has two important implications for economic 
organization.  First, because it is difficult, or perhaps even impossible, to specify all 
relevant attributes of an asset ex ante, ownership rights are assigned to assets, not 
their attributes. Ownership of an asset gives the owner the rights to exploit attributes 
unknown at the time ownership rights are conferred.  Because firms are defined in 
terms of asset ownership, this entrepreneurial perspective helps explain the 
boundaries of the firm.  Second, because attributes of assets are costly to measure, 
and often unknown even to their owners, entrepreneurs must often experiment with 
different combinations of capital goods. This explains why firm boundaries are 
constantly shifting over time.  We pursue some implications of these overall ideas in 
the rest of this section. 
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Entrepreneurship, Experimentation and the Existence of the Firm14 
 In the modern economics of organization, the costs of coordinating 
transactions in the economy are largely taken as given.  In other words, the costs of 
organizing a particular transaction with particular characteristics (for example, the 
degree of asset specificity) are the same, not only across firms but also over time.  The 
analyst then proceeds to study the allocation of transactions over alternative modes 
of economic organization. Often this takes a counterfactual form (particularly Hart 
1995).  From the perspective on heterogeneous capital that we have developed in this 
paper, the conventional approach is not entirely satisfactory.  First, the entrepreneur 
need not take asset attributes such as temporal and site specificity as given, as data 
for the problem of determining efficient organization; rather, such attributes are 
created or discovered through experimentation with different combinations of 
heterogeneous capital assets.  Second, the costs of coordinating heterogeneous capital 
assets in production may change over time as a consequence of establishing new 
attributes of capital assets. Third, the ability to create or discover new attributes may 
vary systematically across modes of economic organization. The modern economics 
of organization provides little insight into these problems because it takes 
technological knowledge as a datum, focusing exclusively on the choice between 
technologies characterized by different degrees of asset specificity  (Langlois and 
Foss 1999).    
 As Hayek (1941) and Lachmann (1956) explained, capital heterogeneity is 
closely related to the coordination problem.  Thus, in a world of shmoo, coordination 
of plans is relatively straightforward.  In the real world of heterogeneous capital 
assets, production plans are much more difficult to coordinate.  Neoclassical 
microtheory sidesteps these problems by focusing on production functions, which 
assume that the assets controlled by the firm are already in their best uses.  More 
realistically, however, agents are unlikely to have full knowledge ex ante about, for 
example, the optimal sequence of tasks, even if these agents had perfect knowledge 
about the functional characteristics of the relevant (physical) assets.  Strikingly, the 
problem of defining an optimal sequence of tasks in even relatively simple 
production systems may require more calculation capacity than is available in a 
supercomputer (Galloway 1996).15  Given that the relationships among assets are 
generally unknown ex ante, some experimentation is necessary.  First, one must 
isolate the system boundaries, that is, where the relevant relationships among assets 
are most likely to be located.  Second, the experimental process must be like a 
controlled experiment (or a sequence of such experiments) to isolate the system from 
outside disturbances.  Third, there must be some sort of guidance for the experiment.  
This may take many forms, ranging from centrally provided instructions to 
                                                 
14  The reasoning in this section is described in greater detail in Foss and Foss (2000b).  
15  Thus, in describing the problem of scheduling batches in a 5 stage production process, Galloway 
(1996) writes: “[t]he best schedule is the one which minimizes this idle time. Unfortunately, the 
only way to find the best schedule is by trial and error, and with 20 batches there are 1.8x1018 
possible schedules. This problem is too large even for modern computers, so a simplifying 
assumption is frequently used” (p.64). 
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negotiated agreements to shared understandings of where in the system to begin 
experimenting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to revised the 
experiment in light of past results, and so on.   
 This description of experimental activity is not merely a heuristic model; it 
regularly takes place in manufacturing departments in connection with identifying 
errors, installing new equipment, fine-tuning existing equipment, fine-tuning 
routines, finding ways to adjust to new inputs or input qualities, and the like.  In the 
present context, the central problem is how this experimental process is best 
organized.  Does the need for experimentation explain the existence of the firm, or 
can such experimentation be organized efficiently through markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction cost, all rights to all 
uses of all assets could be specified in contracts.  By contrast, in a world of 
heterogeneous assets with attributes that are costly to measure and partly 
unforeseen, complete contracts cannot be drafted.  In turn, the resulting incomplete 
contracting may necessitate organization within the firm, or managed coordination 
through the entrepreneur’s central direction.  If relationship-specific assets are 
involved, the holdup problem described above becomes a serious concern.  (Asset 
specificity may itself be an outcome of an experimental process.)  More specifically, 
as experimental activity provides information about how to optimize the system, 
assets will be increasingly specific in terms of time and location.  Temporal and site 
specificity will tend to increase as assets become more efficiently coordinated.16  This 
provides one rationale for organizing the experiments inside firms, though not the 
only one.  Firms may also be justified by problems associated with the dispersion of 
knowledge across agents.  Production systems may exhibit multiple equilibria, so 
that it is not obvious how to coordinate on equilibria or even which equilibria are the 
most preferred ones.   
 In principle, one may imagine that an experimenting team hires an outside 
consultant that guides the experimental activity by giving advice on the sequence of 
actions and asset uses, initiating the experiments, drawing the appropriate 
conclusions from each experiments, determining how these conclusions should 
influence further experimentation, and so on.  However, such an arrangement is 
likely to run into numerous bargaining costs, not the least because under market 
contracting, any team member may be able to veto the advice provided by the 
consultant.  Succumbing to authority may be the cost effective way of organizing the 
experimental activity.  “Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the right to 
redefine and reallocate decision rights among team members, and the right to 
sanction team members who do not use their decision rights efficiently.  By 
possessing these rights, entrepreneur-managers can conduct experiments without 
continuously having to renegotiate contracts, saves bargaining and drafting costs.  
Such an arrangement then provides a setting for carrying out “controlled” 
experiments in which the entrepreneur-manager only changes some aspects of tasks 
                                                 
16  For example, just-in-time production systems often lead to an increase in asset specificity. 
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to trace the effects of some specific rearrangements of rights.  Arranging property 
rights in this way is tantamount to forming a firm.   
Entrepreneurship, Experimentation, and the Boundaries of the Firm17 
The theory of firm boundaries is a relatively undeveloped area in the Austrian 
literature. Klein (1996) argues for a modified Coasian, or contractual, view of firm 
boundaries, in which the limits to organization are given by the need to perform 
economic calculation using prices generated in external markets. Other writers see 
the Austrian approach as more congenial to the resource-based theory of the firm, 
defining firms’ capabilities in terms of Hayekian tacit knowledge (Langlois 1992; 
Minkler 1993). In either case, we can think of a merger or takeover as a response to a 
valuation discrepancy: Acquisition occurs when the value of an existing firm’s assets 
is greater to an outside party than to its current owners. Put differently, merger can 
be a response to economies of scope, in that the value of the merging firms’ assets 
combined exceeds their joint values separately.  
 New combinations of corporate assets can generate efficiencies by replacing 
poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or establishing internal 
capital markets. Like other business practices that do not conform to textbook models 
of competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long been 
viewed with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities. However, 
the academic literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings do, on average, 
create value (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). 
Given such benefits, why are many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-
off, or carve-out? Klein and Klein (2001a) distinguish between two basic views. The 
first, which may be termed empire building, holds that entrenched managers make 
acquisitions primarily to increase their own power, prestige or control, producing 
negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-controlled firms are 
likely to be divested ex post. Most important, because the acquiring firm’s motives 
are suspect, such acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, 
based on pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over 
time. (Moreover, by permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are 
also guilty of systematic error.)  
A second view, which Klein and Klein (2001a) term entrepreneurial market 
process, acknowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but 
argues that poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency. In the 
market-process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean 
simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future 
conditions or otherwise learned from experience. As Mises (1949: 252) puts it, “the 
outcome of action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation.” Consequently, 
“the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the 
future structure of the market for business operations promising profits. This specific 
                                                 
17  This section draws on material in Klein and Klein (2001a). 
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anticipative understanding of the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules 
and systematization” (p. 585, emphasis added).  
 Klein and Klein (2001a) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success 
or failure of corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of 
manager control or principal-agent problems. However, significantly higher rates of 
divestiture tend to follow mergers that occur in a cluster of mergers in the same 
industry. As argued by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Stafford (1999), 
and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), mergers frequently occur in industry 
clusters, suggesting that mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such 
as regulatory shocks. When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, 
economic calculation becomes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is 
hampered. It should not be surprising that poor long-term performance is more 
likely under those conditions. 
 This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares 
with recent theories of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski 1997; 
Boot, Milbourn, and Thakor 1999; Matsusaka, 2001). In these models, profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs can learn their own capabilities only by trying various combinations of 
activities, which could include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus 
make diversifying acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be 
reversed in a divestiture. This process generates information that is useful for 
revising entrepreneurial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful 
even if individual acquisitions are not. In these cases, the long-term viability of an 
acquisition may be systematically related to publicly observable, pre-merger 
characteristics associated with experimentation, but not characteristics associated 
with managerial discretion. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Capital theory is a difficult subject, one “beset with many perplexities and 
ambiguities” (Garrison 1990: 133).  Most of these difficulties involve aggregate 
measurement problems: How large is the economy’s overall capital stock, and how 
“long” is the average period of production?  A substantial body of literature in 
Austrian economics addresses these questions, especially as they relate to 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  However, Austrian writers have paid relatively little 
attention to the microeconomic aspects of capital heterogeneity. We have argued that 
the Austrian theory of capital, particularly as developed by Kirzner (1966), has 
important implications for the theory for economic organization.  Heterogeneous, 
time-dimensioned capital, “real” uncertainty, and entrepreneurship help explain the 
existence of firms and changes in the boundaries of firms.  While some aspects of 
these ideas have been incorporated into contemporary theories of the firm, the full 
implications of Austrian capital theory have not yet been fully appreciated. 
We are sympathetic to modern theories of economic organization, such as the 
transaction cost and incomplete contracts approaches, that also focus on asset 
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ownership. However, as Demsetz (1991) points out, these approaches treat 
knowledge needed for production as essentially free, while knowledge needed for 
exchange is costly. Langlois and Foss (1999) further argue that transaction cost 
economics and the incomplete contracts theory of the firm are, on the production 
side, derived too closely from the neoclassical production-function setup with its 
attendant assumptions.  Arguably, these theories do not take the idea of 
heterogeneous capital seriously enough.   
Capabilities theories, by contrast, acknowledge that both production and 
transaction knowledge are costly.  The Austrian theory that we have outlined in this 
paper clearly sides with the capabilities approach in this regard:  if capital assets 
(including knowledge assets) are heterogeneous in sense outlined above, the 
knowledge needed for production should be costly to acquire.  For this reason, firms 
do not possess the same “capabilities.”  Still, our approach to economic organization, 
which ties together heterogeneous assets, entrepreneurship, and transaction 
(measurement) costs, is more microeconomic than the usual capabilities approach.  
We are confident that further research along these lines will continue to be fruitful. 
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